Al-Farabi and the Gettier Problem

Al-Farabi lived between the years 870 and 950. Although he was described as the second Aristotle in his own time, he is regarded as the founder of logic and the systematizer of the theory of knowledge in Islamic thought.

In his work titled Kitab al-Burhan, which is thought to have been written in the late 9th and early 10th centuries, Al-Farabi examines the concept of knowledge. This book still preserves its value as his first and most important work on epistemology.

Kitab al-Burhan and Demonstrative Knowledge

Al-Farabi distinguished types of knowledge according to their degrees of certainty and established an ordered system. Accordingly: It is based on probabilities and does not carry certainty.

1. Probable Knowledge (Zanni): It is based on probabilities and does not carry certainty.
   Example: It looks like it will rain tomorrow.

2. Dialectical Knowledge (Cedli): It is based on the acceptance of the majority as a result of discussion.
   Example: (s) says that p is true.

3. Rhetorical Knowledge (Hitabi): It is aimed at persuasion. Like the other two types of knowledge, it does not carry certainty.
   Example: If you do good deeds, you may be happy.

4. Demonstrative Knowledge (Burhani): It is based on necessary causes and first principles. Demonstrative knowledge corresponds to what can be considered a priori certain knowledge today.
   Example: Water boils at 100 degrees at sea level.

Additionally, syllogisms are also examples of demonstrative knowledge.

For Example:
p1 All humans are mortal.
p2 Socrates is a human.
q1 Therefore, Socrates is mortal.

Al-Farabi also divides the type of knowledge that exists within the mind into two categories: Tasavvur (Conception) and Tasdiq (Assent).

Tasavvur means forming the concept of something in the mind, while Tasdiq means making a judgment about something, that is, affirming or denying it as true or false.

Tasavvur grasps the essence of a thing in the mind. This thing can be either abstract or concrete.
Example: Triangle, Love...

Tasdiq, on the other hand, combines more than one thing and makes a comparison or a judgment.
Example: Deductive reasoning.

According to Al-Farabi, these two concepts are closely related, and one cannot exist without the other.

However, what truly makes knowledge “knowledge” is Tasdiq. In other words, to attain demonstrative (Burhani) knowledge, Tasdiq is essential.

A Priori or Evveliyat

Al-Farabi, nearly 900 years before Kant, put the concept of a priori into writing under the name of first principles. According to him, “knowledge” falls within the scope of demonstrative (Burhani) knowledge only if it is necessary, unchanging, and universal. These principles are what he calls "Evveliyat", necessary and causal knowledge.

We can directly regard Evveliyat (First Principles) as the a priori knowledge we know from Immanuel Kant. That is, this type of knowledge consists of self-evident and necessarily true propositions of reason.
Example: X cannot both exist and not exist at the same time.

According to Al-Farabi, true knowledge can only occur through a relation of necessity, that is, by knowing why something is the way it is (understanding the causal connection).

Necessity: The impossibility of something being otherwise.
Example: A can not be B.

Causality: The necessary dependence of one thing on another.
Example: The sun rose, and it became bright.
Here, the rising of the sun is the cause (ʿillah).(1)
The brightness of the environment is the effect (ma‘lūl).(2)

According to Al-Farabi: The Certainty of Knowledge

Al-Farabi divides the degrees of certainty in knowledge into three categories: ʿIlm (Scientific Knowledge), Yaqin (Certainty/Conviction), and Levels of Intellectual Perception (Stages of Acquiring Knowledge).

1. ʿIlm can be defined as certain knowledge obtained through demonstrative reasoning (Burhani reason).Accordingly, ʿIlm:Accordingly, ʿIlm:
   Accordingly, ʿIlm: Accordingly, ʿIlm:
   – Possesses necessity,
   – Is based on cause,
   – Is universal.

For Al-Farabi, true knowledge is ʿIlm, because it is rational knowledge that has reached Yaqīn (certainty).

2. Yaqīn is the state in which the mind is completely convinced about a proposition. It includes the element of necessity and is divided into two subcategories:

– Natural Yaqīn: Knowledge that an individual is inwardly convinced of.

– Demonstrative Yaqīn: Knowledge based on evidence, reason, and a priori principles (this includes certainty).

3. Levels of Intellectual Perception (ʿAqlī Idrāk Levels) are examined by Al-Farabi in four distinct stages:

- The first is Potential Intellect (ʿAql bi’l-quwwa): at this stage, the human mind has not yet attained knowledge but is open and ready to receive it.

- The second is Actual Intellect (ʿAql bi’l-fiʿl): the mind begins to comprehend knowledge; learning begins.

- The third is Acquired Intellect (ʿAql Mustafād): at this stage, the individual grasps abstract and necessary knowledge, drawing closer to truth.

- Finally, the fourth stage is Active Intellect (ʿAql Faʿʿāl): here, the individual directly apprehends universal truths. According to Al-Farabi, only prophets and philosophers can reach this final stage.

Now that we have summarized Al-Farabi’s epistemology in this way, we can turn to one of the fundamental and most significant problems of modern epistemology, the Gettier problem.

Could Al-Farabi’s understanding of Burhani (demonstrative) knowledge and the epistemic system he established in his book be capable of overcoming this powerful objection to the definition of knowledge?

The Gettier Problem in Relation to Al-Farabi’s Understanding of Epistemology

Since I have already discussed the Gettier problem in detail in my previous epistemological study, I will not go into an explanation of it again here. The aim of this paper is to discuss to what extent Al-Farabi’s epistemological approach relates to the definition of knowledge put forward by the Gettier problem, and whether this relationship provides a possible means of resolution.

Al-Farabi regards Burhani (demonstrative) knowledge as the highest form of knowledge, grounded in necessary causes and first principles. This type of knowledge is based on necessity and foundational principles. The concept of demonstrative knowledge is extremely powerful in itself, as it cannot be falsified and encompasses things considered certain, such as mathematics. However, with this approach, he also separates all other types of knowledge from certainty. In other words, according to Al-Farabi, knowledge obtained outside of a priori principles cannot be fully trusted.

When examined closely, it becomes evident that Al-Farabi’s system of knowledge follows a different path from the kind of epistemic issues indicated by the Gettier problem. For him, certainty should not be sought within knowledge that is not grounded in deductive reasoning, necessary causes, and first principles. This epistemic approach differs from most modern perspectives, as it does not concern itself with the certainty of knowledge commonly accepted in everyday life.

If this approach is accepted as correct, then the knowledge we possess in an epistemic sense would be quite limited. For this reason, modern epistemologists have worked for years to develop a more acceptable definition of knowledge. However, as shown in my previous study, every system of knowledge has been confronted with the Gettier problem and its derivatives.

Al-Farabi’s perspective does not solve the Gettier problem, because it does not intersect directly with it, he grounds the concept of knowledge on an entirely different plane, within ontological necessity. Although this perspective restricts what we can claim to know, it establishes a more stable and unshakable understanding of knowledge, one capable of withstanding such major problems.

Perhaps Al-Farabi is right. Perhaps true and certain knowledge can indeed be attained only through deductive reasoning and a priori principles. As for the remaining types of knowledge, even if they are in fact true, we may always need to leave room for that margin of error.

References

Al-Farabi. Kitab al-Burhan (Book of Demonstration). In: Muhsin Mahdi (ed.), Alfarabi’s Philosophy of Plato and Aristotle, Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1962.

Al-Farabi. Kitab al-Burhan (The Book of Demonstration). Edited by R. Walzer, in Al-Farabi on the Perfect State. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1985.

Davidson, Herbert A. Alfarabi, Avicenna, and Averroes on Intellect: Their Cosmologies, Theories of the Active Intellect, and Theories of Human Intellect. Oxford University Press, 1992.

Kant, Immanuel. Critique of Pure Reason. Translated by Paul Guyer and Allen W. Wood. Cambridge University Press, 1998

Gettier, Edmund L. “Is Justified True Belief Knowledge?” Analysis 23, no. 6 (1963): 121–123.

Netton, Ian Richard. Al-Farabi and His School. London: Routledge, 1992.