In defence of 7.62 NATO

Shortly after the second world war, the North Atlantic Trade Organization was formed as a means to unite the Allied nations into one geopolitical coalition, thus rendering the threat of a third war in Europe obsolete. In the late 1940s, NATO invested resources into unifying the logistics chain of all of its constituent nations. This included the R&D on a new rifle, which would become the FN FAL and a new round, 7.62 NATO. 

7.62 NATO was not without its controversy, however. The US adopted the 7.62 NATO round in the M14 rifle, but very quickly pivoted, as the UK did, towards developing their own round based on their assessments, without the explicit consent of their alliance. This round was developed by Eugene Stoner with assistance from Remington, based on the .222 Remington hunting calibre. This development came after the US Army rejected Stoner's AR10, on the grounds of it being "too heavy". Stoner's response was to shrink the rifle down around an existing cartridge that would be more lightweight. From this, the M16 and .223 ammunition was born. 

In 1980 NATO officially recognized .223 as their second standardized round, designating it as 5.56x45. Detractors such as this unnamed US Army general had this to say about it; "On 28 October 1980, after more than four years of extensive testing at the German Infantry School at Hammelburg, Federal Republic of Germany, the NATO Small Arms Test Control Commission (NSMATCC) approved the standardization of a second rifle calibre cartridge. The cartridge selected was the intermediate power 5.56 x 45mm (.223 Caliber) and the improved Belgian version, the SS109, was selected as the basis for standardization.

 As a result, NATO now has two standard rifle calibre cartridges, the full power 7.62 x 51mm NATO (.308 Caliber), in service since 1953, and the new intermediate power 5.56 x 45mm NATO adopted in 1980. Although the selection of the 5.56 x 45mm cartridge was based on extensive testing, research, and documented battle performance, this intermediate power round is not the optimum ammunition and calibre for U. S. and NATO forces in the contemplated battlefields of the future."

It should be made obvious to the reader that the adoption of a smaller and weaker calibre was seen as an atrocious mistake by many of NATO's generals. One major deciding criterion for the adoption of 5.56 was the uncontrollability of fully automatic fire with 7.62 NATO. The same document quoted before has this to say in retort; "The concept that greater firepower can be achieved by providing as much infantrymen with a fully automatic fire capability is not realistic.  Battle experience has shown that full automatic fire from light assault rifles is largely ineffective and only results in the expenditure of large quantities of ammunition.

Even with the lower recoil generated by 5.56mm ammunition, automatic fire dispersion is still too large to be effective. Fire power is normally equated with maximum "steel" on target, not with maximum steel in the general direction of the target.  Full automatic fire with the 5.56mm NATO just as wasteful and confirming this view is the fact that second-generation assault

rifles, such as the U.S. M16A2 and Belgian FN FNC, are now employing a 3-shot burst control in lieu of a fully automatic capability." The text continues, "With this burst control feature, a thirty round magazine produces only ten bursts.  Do we need thirty rounds to successfully hit and incapacitate ten enemy targets?" Both Eugene Stoner and Mikhail Kalashnikov confirmed that fully automatic fire is useless beyond close range, and a two-round burst would have been preferable to a three-round burst in their meeting in 1990. 

Did our militaries choose a calibre based on circumstantial ramblings of military generals who've only ever shot a rifle in basic training? Many seem to believe this is exactly the case. The adoption of 5.56 has been used as an example of how detached NATO's military leadership is from the field. According to this argument, the US's generals chose an underpowered, poorer performing round based on the coolness of the M16 rifle, and have stuck to it despite the round underperforming in combat, especially against targets wearing armour. Meanwhile, until the adoption of level III steel plates, 7.62x39R shot out of the AK platform has been very effective against NATO's forces.

To close, it is firmly the belief of the writer that NATO should have never adopted 5.56, nor should it have moved away from 7.62 NATO. The latter is a significantly superior round in contrast to the former, mistakes were made.