some notes from some books

Some philosophers claimed that existence consists of sensible things. But we know that these sensible beings can be given only one name. These single names are called natural universals. The modal nouns of natural universals are called individual entities. For example: When we think about human name, we do not think of height, weight, eye color, hair color, etc., because the name human being is a natural universal and it only means thinking creature it is not individualized. But when we think of name Yiğit, we think of an individiual with a height, weight, eye and hair color, because the name Yiğit is individiualized. Now the question is this: Are natural universals sensible or not? If they are not, then existence would not consist only in sensible things, since natural universals have the status of existence beyond being mere linguistic homophones. For two completely different individuals like Yigit and Emily are not merely linguistically but actually common in the sense of being human, and this commonality is something other than their individual being. If natural universals could be sensible , these natural universals would be individualized. Because everything that can be sensible has a length, width, breadth and weight etc.. For example, if the natural universal human name were sensable, this would require it to be individuated; it would have to have a certain height, weight, eye color, hair color, etc. This would prevent us from predicating natural universals such as “Yiğit is human” or “Emily is human” to other individual beings. But we clearly know that we can say “Yiğit is human” or “Emily is human”. Natural universals, then, are not subject to the five senses and are not material. With that, doubts of materialism have been answered